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Perfecting the Administrative 
Solution to Labour Disputes 
The British Columbia Experiment 
P.A. Joseph 
An analysis of the unique nature of the administrative solu-
tion to labour disputes in British Columbia expérience, with par-
ticular référence to section 33 of the Labour Code. 
The Labour Code of British Columbia received royal assent on 7 
November 1973. ' The provincial législature believed that the substitution of 
self (économie) régulation through administrative control of labour 
disputes was the needed response to British Columbia's labour problems.2 
In promoting the BilPs passage, the then Minister of Labour, the Hon. 
W.S. King, explained: 
"The courts of law can only really catch a glimpse of the overall labour picture. 
Their interférence in the past has been sporadic and fortuitous. The judges lack the 
intimate knowledge of the very dynamic process of industrial relations and collective 
bargaining. For thèse reasons, ... the new labour code has removed the court's 
jurisdiction over labour disputes . . . . The new law seeks an administrative rather 
than a judicial solution to labour disputes. "3 
Not of récent times has Canadian collective bargaining législation 
preferred judicial procédures to the flexible, administrative procédures of 
the permanently constituted board. Thus for the Labour Code to seek "an 
administrative rather than a judicial solution to labour disputes"4 is not 
new.5. The striking feature of the Code is section 33, the clause by which it 
seeks to effect the administrative solution. "[NJovel, controversial, and 
arguably unconstitutional",6this provision attests to the législature^ désire 
to devise a privative clause which would succeed where others had failed.7 
It is noteworthy that in the case of Canada and eight provinces, the in-
itial post-war collective bargaining statutes contained privative clauses pur-
porting to exclude judicial review of board décisions. As early as 1952, 
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however, virtually upon the enactment of thèse clauses, Bora Laskin 
observed the "apparent futility" of thèse attempts to oust the superior 
courts.8 "In the face of such enactments", Laskin cautioned, "judicial per-
sistence in exercising a reviewing power involves an arrogation of authority 
only on the basis of constitutional principle (and there is no such principle) 
or on the basis of some 'élite' theory of knowing what is best for ail con-
cerned'\9 This objection to judicial review, based on the principle of 
législative supremacy in Canada, serves notice of the constitutional argu-
ment enjoining the court's obédience to the privative clause. Yet, the 
following décades of judicial activism in administrative law enabled Pro-
fessor N.W.R. Wade to comment recently that it is to be hoped that courts 
will not be dissuaded by the Code's unusual provisions from assuming their 
traditional supervisory rôle.10. 
In light of thèse opposing views, this article examines whether the 
Minister in 1973 was correct when he pronounced "the code has removed 
the court's jurisdiction".11 The examination falls into two parts. The first 
(under the headings THE JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS, THE 
BACKGROUND TO SECTION 33, APPROACHES TO SECTION 33) 
reveals why British Columbia experimented with "novel, controversial, and 
arguably unconstitutional" législation.12 Despite a noticeable drafting im-
perfection, it will be shown that the Code's Provisions can be penetrated 
only in disregard of the statutory direction that "[e] very enactment shall be 
... given such fair, large, and libéral construction and interprétation as best 
ensures the attainment of its objects".13 Through interacting one with 
another, thèse provisions preclude the usual conceptual justification for 
judicial review in face of the privative clause. 
The second part reveals whether the législature has in fact created a col-
lective bargaining régime operating exclusive of the courts. As the headings 
hère indicate {THE BOARD'S RETREAT and THE JUDICIAL INCUR-
SION), British Columbia courts desiring to intervene hâve not hesitated to 
disavow the Code's instruction. 
THE JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Discussed first is section 34(1), the principal intent of which is to grant 
the Board exclusive jurisdiction to résolve questions "arising under this 
Act". 
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Section 34(1) 
"34.(1) The board has exclusive jurisdiction to décide any questions arising under 
this Act, and, upon application by any person, or on its own motion, may décide for 
ail purposes of this Act any question, including, without restricting the generality of 
the foregoing, any question as to whether 
(in parts (a) to (w), a range of subject-matter arising under the Code)." 
This provision contains the drafting defect. The debates in 1973 in-
dicate that the législature intended not only to remove the court's powers of 
review but also to bequeath the Board exclusive, original jurisdiction over 
ail matters involving the Code, whether arising directly or incidently in the 
course of proceedings under it.14 Section 34(1) not only fails to invest this 
exclusive jurisdiction but — to the extent it leaves the courts concurrent 
jurisdiction — also enhances the likelihood of judicial review of Board déci-
sions. 
The drafting defect 
The section confers jurisdiction in three stages. First, the opening 
words grant the Board exclusive jurisdiction, reinforced by the privative 
clause, to décide ail questions "arising under [the] Act". The second stage, 
"and may décide for ail purposes of this Act any question", is distinct from 
the first. Thèse words dénote concurrent jurisdiction in the Board and the 
courts to interpret and apply law external to the Code, where such law must 
be considered in the course of proceedings under it. 
It is difficult to envisage situations in which courts could exercise this 
original jurisdiction, since only the Board can préside over Code pro-
ceedings.15 Nonetheless, the conséquences affecting the third stage by which 
section 34(1) confers jurisdiction confirm that the rétention of concurrent 
jurisdiction at this second stage is a drafting error. The third stage is an ex-
tension of the second, bestowing jurisdiction by way of spécification (in 
parts (a) to (w)) of matters which the Board "may décide for ail purposes of 
this Act". As an extension of the second, it requires to be read in the same 
light as denoting concurrent and not exclusive jurisdiction. 
The Board has declined this reading, however,16 preferring in effect to 
treat the spécifications as extensions of the first rather than second stage by 
which jurisdiction is granted. This is understandable in view of the impor-
tance to the Code's opération of the matters so specified, matters which the 
législature intented to be the Board's exclusive concern. And yet at least one 
British Columbia court has served notice of concurrent jurisdiction to deter-
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mine thèse matters (the court hère disclaiming jurisdiction to entertain ques-
tions not so specified). 
In Pitura v Lincoln Manor et al.,17 the issue was whether the Suprême 
Court had jurisdiction to détermine liability in tort for intimidation and in-
terférence with contractual relations arising from a construction contract. 
Munroe J. did not examine the sections bequeathing the Board's jurisdic-
tion, y et accepted that where the issue is whether the Labour Code or a col-
lective agreement has been breached the Board has exclusive jurisdiction.18 
Thèse are questions not specified in parts (a) to (w). This is significant 
because Munroe J. affirmed the court's jurisdiction to proceed with the 
common law action on the ground that "[the] letter of undertaking ... is not 
a collective agreement between the plaintiff and the défendant union".19 In 
contrast to the former issue (whether breach of the Labour Code or a collec-
tive agreement has occurred), parts (c) and (g) of section 34(1) designate 
whether a collective agreement "has been entered into" and "is in full force 
and effect" to be questions for the Board. 
In deciding, then, that the contested letter did not satisfy the Code's re-
quirements so as to constitute a collective agreement, the court effectively 
construed section 34(1) as allocating the questions in (a) to (w) concurrently 
to the courts and the Board. Indeed, the court added that if the legality of a 
strike or lockout must be established in support of a claim for damages, the 
court must remit the matter to the Board for détermination.20. Since this is a 
further issue not addressed by parts (a) to (w), presumably Munroe J. 
treated it as falling within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction conferred by 
the opening words of the section, "to décide any question arising under 
[the]Act,\ 
Whatever the judge's perception of the court's relationship to the 
Board, thèse rulings comply with the drafting of section 34(1) which, on any 
reading, fails to bequeath the Board exclusive jurisdiction other than at the 
first stage. 
An avenue for review? 
The existing ground for review, established on the 'external law* doc-
trine, is examined below. The possibility arises at this stage, however, of the 
courts extending their review jurisdiction on a further ground, coinciding 
with their concurrent jurisdiction over such matters as that in issue in 
Pitura. 
It is not a necessary condition of jurisdiction shared concurrently with 
the courts that, by that fact, it be also reviewable. But the judicial presump-
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tion is that the législature does not intend the foreclosure of judicial review 
in every instance when it invests an inferior tribunal with jurisdiction and 
decrees that that jurisdiction be imrriune from review.21 Labour cases in par-
ticular illustrate this where the législature seeks to secure the independence 
of the administrative decision-maker from the outset, by granting exclusive 
and not concurrent jurisdiction.22^ fortiori, where the initial junsdiction 
confided is not exclusive — where the subject-matter of the empowering 
statute does not render the issues wholly inappropriate for judicial décision 
— the courts can be expected to apply the presumption more readily. 
Therefore, it may be that a superior court inclining toward a contrary 
view of the legalities would not be loath to upset a Board décision entered 
under parts (a) to (w) of section 34(1), whatever the effect of the Code's 
privative clause; otherwise, the courts may ask, why did the législature 
préserve their original jurisdiction? However, to date the opportunity for 
the British Columbia courts to overturn the Board on any of thèse matters 
has not arisen. 
As a resuit of the drafting defect, then, section 34(1), to the extent that 
it encourages judicial review, does not heed the Minister's statement in 
1973, admonishing the courts for their past intervention and declaring that 
henceforth their jurisdiction is removed.23 This is pertinent since the 
législature endorsed the Minister's statement when it enacted the Board's 
extraordinary mandate (namely section 33, discussed below) to détermine 
the extent of its own jurisdiction; surely, it is anomalous to confer exclusive 
jurisdiction to détermine jurisdiction and, at the same time, reserve to the 
courts their traditional powers to police juristictional error. 
Thus, although section 33 is still capable of excluding those powers,24 
section 34(1) is in need of strengthening. The amendment proposed is to 
remove the court's original jurisdiction for ail purposes of the Code, 
deleting the existing words in parenthesis and substituting the italicized 
parts: 
"34.(1) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to décide any question arising under 
this Act, and, upon application by any person, or on its own motion, (may décide 
for ail purposes of this Act any question, including) to décide for ail purposes ofthis 
Act any question howsoever arising, and, without restricting the generality of the 
foregoing, has and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction to décide any question as to 
whether 
(specifying paragraphs (a) to (w))." 
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Section 31 
The second provision granting gênerai powers to the Board reads: 
"31. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Board has and shall exercise ex-
clusive jurisdiction to hear and détermine an application or complaint under the pro-
visions of this Act and to make any order permitted to be made and, without limiting 
the generality of the foregoing, the board has and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
in respect of 
(a) any matter in respect of which the board has jurisdiction under this Act or the 
régulations; 
(b) any matter in respect of which the board détermines under section 33 that it has 
jurisdiction; and 
(c) any application for the régulation, restraint or prohibition of any person or 
group of persons from 
(i) ceasing or refusing to perform work or to remain in a relationship of 
employment; or 
(ii) picketing, striking, or locking out; or 
(iii) communicating information or opinion in a labour dispute by speech, 
writing, or any other means. 
The most exceptional feature of this provision is paragraph (b) in that 
it is dépendent upon the exercise of the Board's section 33 jurisdiction 
(discussed presently). Also exceptional is paragraph (c) granting exclusive 
jurisdiction over inter alia strikes and lockouts. Reinforcing this is section 
32(1) which stipulâtes that "no court has or shall exercise any jurisdiction in 
respect of ... a matter referred to in section 3 1 " , and, in respect of the 
labour injunction,25 that "no court shall make an order enjoining or pro-
hibiting any act or thing in respect of". 
Other sections 
Further provisions requiring mention are sections 32(2), 87 and 89. Sec-
tion 87 divests the courts of jurisdiction in respect of torts (specifically, 
trespass and interférence with contractual relations) committed in fur-
therance of strikes, lockouts, or picketing permitted by the Code. The com-
panion provision is section 89. This excludes the conspiracy action in 
respect of acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a labour dispute 
which, in the absence of combination or agreement, would not be 
wrongful.26 
Overriding thèse provisions is section 32(2). This provision saves the 
court's jurisdiction where a "wrongful act or omission ... causes an im-
médiate danger of serious injury to any individual or causes an actual 
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obstruction or physical damage to property".27 By virtue of section 32(3), 
however, the court's jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief on an exporte ap-
plication does not survive. 
Section 33 
The unique feature of the Board's jurisdiction is section 33. As well as 
being an independent source of jurisdiction, this provision strengthens the 
grants of exclusive jurisdiction in sections 31 and 34(1) and, not least, the 
privative clause in section 34(2).28 
"33. The board has and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction to détermine the extent 
of its jurisdiction under this Act, a collective agreement, or the régulations, and to 
détermine any fact or question of law that is necessary to establish its jurisdiction, 
and to détermine whether or not or in what manner it shall exercise its jurisdiction." 
THE BACKGROUND TO SECTION 33 
In Canada the inherited principle of législative supremacy is modified 
by a distribution of législative power consonant with federalism. But as 
Lakin earlier explained,29 the supremacy of the législature is still the car-
dinal principle of the Canadian political System.30 The relationship of the 
judiciary to the législature, therefore, is restrictively defined by the rule en-
joining judicial obédience to the enacted word. This rule, and the relation-
ship it so defines, is manifest in the gênerai interprétative function assigned 
to the courts in applying statutes; so long as enactments remain within the 
federal-provincial allocation of législative power, this function in Canada 
has never permitted judicial invalidation of statutes on constitutional 
grounds. 
Consequently, if législative supremacy be the cardinal principle, then 
the only justification for the courts assuming their supervisory rôle over in-
ferior tribunals is to ensure the sanctity of the législature^ word — to en-
sure that the administrative agency created by statute complies strictly with 
the terms of its création. Commonplace with the expansion of government 
this century is the privative clause. Contained in the empowering statute, it 
is itself a term of the administrative agency's création, albeit as a direction 
addressed in this instance not to the statutory body but to the courts. Simp-
ly, it expresses the désire of the law-making organ that bodies performing 
certain specialised functions be free from judicial constraints, and, if the 
usual policy applies, that they be unrestricted by the procédures that bind 
courts in the discharge of their functions. 
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In no field is that désire more clearly expressed, Laskin observed,31 
than in labour statutes promoting settlement of disputes through collective 
bargaining. Yet the law reports attest that in no jurisdiction in Canada has 
the législature successfully freed the labour board from judicial control.32 
Consider the Ontario labour statute containing the usual privative pro-
visions.33 On each occasion thèse were considered, the court emphatically 
rejected the notion that they could be construed so as to empower the Board 
to err on a matter on which its jurisdiction dépends.34 The reasoning is 
familiar. Since a "décision, order, direction, déclaration or ruling" held to 
be made without jurisdiction is not, in truth, a "décision, order, direction, 
déclaration or ruling", it does not fall within the privative clause.35 On the 
authorities, the most that thèse clauses hâve achieved is to exclude the 
prérogative writs where the Board's error, whether of law or fact, is 
designated 'non-jurisdictional'. However, administrative lawyers familiar 
with Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission16 know that the kinds 
of error so designated are few. (Recently, indeed, Lord Diplock 
acknowledged in the case of inferior tribunals, that "for ail practical pur-
poses'' Anisminic "abolished" the category of 'non-jurisdictional' error of 
law.37 
Thus, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v International Union of 
Operating Engineers,38 it was no answer that the Ontario Labour Board was 
within its statutory jurisdiction in embarking on the certification proceeding 
since, the Suprême Court held, the Board in the course of the inquiry step-
ped outside its jurisdiction by asking itself a question not assigned by the 
législature. This, for purposes of the judicial inquiry, rendered it irrelevant 
that the Board's practice in thèse proceedings had been developed out of 
regard for the Act's principles facilitating appropriate bargaining units. 
Significantly, following the Suprême Court's décision an amendment 
to the Ontario Act reinstated the practice struck down in Metropolitan 
Life.39 This indicates not only the législature^ disapproval of the court's 
décision but also its désire to protect that which the court hère failed to 
respect, that is, the administrative tribunal's ability to expedite the settle-
ment of labour disputes. Yet, while the amendment reinstates the Board's 
practice, it has not freed it from the jurisprudence of Metropolitan Life. 
Recently, the Ontario Board affirmed that while its former discrétion in cer-
tification proceedings is preserved, it can still exceed its jurisdiction in such 
proceedings by asking itself "the wrong question". This acknowledgement 
of the Board, viewed against the législature^ désire to protect its in-
dependence, shows the extent to which the conceptualism of Anisminic40 
has minimised the effect of the privative clause in the labour statute. 
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It is against this background that section 33 of the Code reveals its pur-
pose. It expresses the clearest législative intent to deprive superior courts of 
the ability to resurrect jurisdiction from the privative clause. In the words of 
the Minister of Labour in 1973, commenting on the Code's procédure for 
an appeal from a three-man panel to a full-sitting of the Board: 
"Allowing for a spécial appeal to an administrative agency, as provided in the labour 
code, is an important innovation in Canadian labour law, ... It is a récognition of the 
unsuitability of review in the courts of administrative décisions by prérogative writs, 
such as certiorari et cetera, where the issue of jurisdiction and not the substance of a 
décision is considered."41 
Further: 
"[T]o jeopardize the décision to court actions ... [could] emasculate the board's ef-
fectiveness to corne to grips with labour problems. That certainly has been the pro-
blem in the past."42 
APPROACHES TO SECTION 33 
This section concentrâtes on arguments that may be used to circumvent 
section 33. This is done not for the reason that a court would attempt thèse 
arguments (rather than grapple with thèse, history indicates thaï: a court 
wishing to intervene would simply ignore section 33)43 but rather to il-
lustrate the logic in support of the Code achieving its object. Preceeding this 
a brief account of the way in which section 33 and its companion provisions 
interact so as to remedy "the problem in the past". 
The législative interaction 
Sections 31 and 34(1) reinforce the Board's unique section 33 jurisdic-
tion. First, section 33, exclusively empowering the Board to détermine the 
extent of its jurisdiction, renders the issue of jurisdiction itself a question 
arising under the Code. Section 34(1), conferring "exclusive jurisdiction to 
décide any question arising under this Act", thus compléments section 33. 
To similar effect, second, section 31 (a) confers "exclusive jurisdiction" 
over "any matter in respect of which the board has jurisdiction under this 
Act"; the issue of jurisdiction itself being one such "matter". If that were 
not sufficient, section 31(b) extends that grant to also include "any matter 
in respect of which the board détermines under section 33 that it has 
jurisdiction". Added to this, section 32(1) stipulâtes that "no court has or 
shall exercise any jurisdiction in respect of a matter that is ... referred to in 
section 3 1 " ; inter alia in respect of the Board's jurisdiction simpliciter or 
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any matter the Board détermines under section 33 to be within its jurisdic-
tion.44 
The main privative provision, however, is section 34(2): 
"34(2) Except in respect of the constitutional jurisdiction of the board, a décision 
or order made by the board under this Act, a collective agreement, or the régula-
tions, upon any matter in respect of which the board has jurisdiction, or détermines 
under section 33 that it has jurisdiction under this Act, a collective agreement, or the 
régulations, is final and conclusive and is not open to question or review in any court 
on any grounds, and no proceedings by or before the board shall be restrained by in-
junction, prohibition, mandamus, or any other process or proceeding in any court, 
or be removable by certiorari or otherwise into any court".45 
In view of section 33, the salient parts of this clause are the words 
4
'upon any matter in respect of which the board has jurisdiction". 
Specifically, if a tribunal is empowered independently of its primary 
jurisdiction to détermine what is, and what is not, within that jurisdiction, 
then any error it thereupon makes is 'non-jurisdictionaF and within the 
scope of the privative clause. Indeed, the only explanation for the 
législature expressly referring in that clause to section 33 is that it intended 
to emphasise this in the event of an application for review. The words in 
question ("or détermines under section 33 that it has jurisdiction under this 
Act, . . .") are superfluous since section 31(b) unambiguously states that 
"the board has and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of ... (b) 
any matter ... [so determined] under section 33" . Since, therefore, the sec-
tion 33 référence could be excised without affecting section 34(1), 
presumably it was included out of an abundance of caution, directing the 
courts' attention to the reasoning excluding the usual avenue for review.46. 
Nevertheless, six arguments may be attempted in support of the prérogative 
writ. 
Possible arguments 
Two of thèse, involving constitutional challenges to the Board's 
jurisdiction, are peculiar to the allocation of federal-provincial powers in 
Canada and will not be examined. The first is based on the proposition that 
there is a constitutional right of access to the courts for purposes of ensur-
ing judicial review of inferior tribunals. The second is that the Board's 
power to define its jurisdiction is, when exercised, a function analogous to 
that of a 'section 96' court, thus violating the constitutional requirement for 
fédéral appointment of judges. Although it is doubtless simply a matter of 
time before both arguments are judicially tested in Canada, it suffices that 
the jurisprudence on which they are based has been examined elsewhere.47 
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Of the remaining four that are examined, thèse are germane to the ad-
ministrative solution to labour disputes and the ingenuity of courts to wrest 
jurisdiction from the administrative board. 
The section 33 détermination 
The first of thèse is avoidable by the Board. The Board, it has been 
seen, has the capacity to détermine its jurisdiction, and to designate matters 
as being within that jurisdiction.48 For that purpose it may be argued that 
section 33 requires there to be a détermination (that there is jurisdiction to 
détermine a matter) and that it be expressly recorded by the Board in order 
to avail itself of the privative sections. In the absence of that preliminary 
measure, Board décisions on matters which it believes are its exclusive con-
cern may be unprotected. 
Despite the certainty of one commentator,49the argument fails on three 
grounds. The first is based on section 32(1), which excludes the courts in 
respect of "a matter that is, or may be, referred to in section 31";50section 
31(b) referring to "[a] matter in respect of which the Board détermines 
under section 33 that it has jurisdiction,\ The operative words being "or 
may be", section 32(1) thus excludes the court's review jurisdiction in 
respect of any matter which the Board may détermine as being within its 
jurisdiction. Since the Board's section 33 jurisdiction is unfettered, this en-
compasses ail matters which the Board proceeds to entertain — matters 
which the Board could, if it so wished, expressly designate as being within 
its jurisdiction. 
The second ground is closely related. Simply, if the Board can 
designate matters within its jurisdiction by express ruling, cannot the Board 
effect the same impliedly by reason of its proceeding with matters on which 
its décision dépends? The différence between an express and an implied rul-
ing for purposes of section 33 is the same as that between express and im-
plied repeal of statutes. In resuit, there is no différence, for in the absence 
of express provision the législature is deemed to intend the repeal of an 
earlier inconsistent statute. Similarly, the Board may be presumed to pro-
ceed with applications on the basis that it has addressed the issue of jurisdic-
tion; in the majority of cases, in fact, the Board*s jurisdiction being so clear 
as not to warrant mention. 
This analogy to express and implied repeal would not succeed were it a 
stated condition of section 33 that each jurisdictional détermination be ex-
pressed in the décision. But section 33 speaks only of a détermination 
howsoever effected, impliedly or expressly. 
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The third ground is that the privative provisions of sections 32 and 
34(2) achieve their purpose notwithstanding the section 33 détermination, 
express or implied. The reason is that any matter which an inferior tribunal 
proceeds to entertain, in truth, raises the question whether it has jurisdic-
tion.51 But where the Board's jurisdiction is in question, sections 33 and 
34(1) direct that that matter be for the Board alone to détermine, thus bring-
ing the issue of jurisdiction itself within the protective terms of section 32 
and 34(2). 
Hence it is enough that the Board possesses its section 33 jurisdiction, 
regardless of whether the détermination be express, implied or made at ail. 
A Board décision disputed on jurisdictional grounds is (to quote section 
34(2)) "a décision made by the Board ... upon [a] matter in respect of which 
the Board has jurisdiction,\ 
Natural justice 
The Suprême Court of Canada has affirmed that failure to comply 
with the rules of natural justice is a matter affecting jurisdiction, not pro-
cédure.52 Consequently, unless the Code relieves the Board of the obligation 
to comply with the rules, bias or failure to afford parties the opportunity to 
be heard will render Board proceedings reviewable. In light of the Code's 
objective, one would expect the législature to designate the Board its own 
master in determining minimum standards of justice for ail purposes of the 
Code's procédures. That expectation caused confusion at the outset, 
however. The uncertainty of the politicians during the législative debates, 
whether the Code ought to exclude the rules, is recorded in Hansard. In the 
clause by clause examination of the Bill, the Attorney General debated the 
Opposition's call for access to the courts. In the event of déniai of natural 
justice, the Attorney General refuted that judicial redress was no longer 
possible: 
"And when I suggest in this Bill that the right to go to the courts in terms of a déniai 
of natural justice is still présent, I say that it's présent in terms of ail our inferior 
tribunals in the Province of British Columbia ... . It isn't true to say that regardless 
of any error there is no access to the courts... [I]n spite of ... [the privative clause], 
the rules of common law apply and the question of natural justice applies... . As I 
say, the unwritten laws of England apply to this inferior tribunal... ."53 
Compounding the uncertainty, the Minister of Labour endorsed the 
Attorney General's speech,54 yet reiterated to the House that the object of 
the législation was to remove the judiciary from the Province's labour rela-
tions.55 
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Which of the Minister's views prevails is unresolved. On the one hand, 
section 21, though empowering the Board to détermine its own practice and 
procédure, stipulâtes that it "shall givz full opportunity to the parties to any 
proceedings to présent évidence and to make submissions".56 In the normal 
case, a décision given in breach of that requirement would render it 
amenable to the prérogative writs. On the other hand, if breach of natural 
justice be a jurisdictional error, it is a logical necessity that a body em-
powered to détermine the extent of its jurisdiction is empowered to déter-
mine whether it need comply with natural justice. 
In this sensé, there is a conflict between the mandatory requirement of 
section 21 and the Board's expansive section 33 jurisdiction. It was early 
recognised by the Board that the draftsman may not hâve anticipated ail the 
effects of the Code's major reforms. Observing that "différent parts of the 
Code may not fit perfectly together",57 the Board resolved that it had a 
commitment to make the législation work: " to smooth off the rough edges 
in the législation to the extent this is legally permissible".58 In that case, the 
Board adhered to its commitment by recognising the need "to afford 
natural justice to the parties, as embodied in s.21".59 In resolving thus, the 
Board did not go as far as to disclaim its section 33 jurisdiction to discharge 
its functions in disregard of the rules, as indeed it is empowered to do. 
However, on the assumption that the Board would be loath to invite an ap-
plication for review attendant on the ruling that it had this jurisdiction, it is 
unlikely that the Board will renege on its commitment to respect the section 
21 requirement. 
Finally, it may be noted, it is not expected that a court would uphold a 
Board décision in breach of natural justice under the third limb of section 
33, conferring "exclusive jurisdiction ... to détermine ... in what manner it 
shall exercise its jurisdiction". It is likely that this would be construed as 
empowering the Board with regard to procédure not affecting jurisdiction.60 
Jurisdiction ''under this act" 
The jurisdictional provisions pivot on section 33. The third argument 
on which a court might évade thèse provisions involves a restrictive inter-
prétation of section 33. This requires focussing on the primary jurisdiction 
that the section confers on the Board: namely, " to détermine the extent of 
its jurisdiction under this Act, ...".61 By so doing, it is possible to treat the 
Board's section 33 jurisdiction as being circumscribed by the jurisdiction 
possessed under the Code independently of section 33. The section 33 
jurisdiction could not then be invoked by the Board to détermine matters 
held, as a matter of statutory construction, to be in excess of the Code. Fur-
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ther, the fact that the jurisdiction conferred by section 33 is exclusive would 
not defeat this reasoning, nor therefore a court ruling that/the Board had 
asked itself 'the wrong question'. 
The difficulty with this argument is that the Board, in determining the 
extent of its jurisdiction "under this Act", is also endowed by section 33 
with the "exclusive jurisdiction ... to détermine any fact or question oflaw 
that is necessary to establish its jurisdiction".62 This second limb mandates 
the Board to construe the Act for the very purpose of establishing jurisdic-
tion. Furthermore, what the Code's provisions enact are themselves ques-
tions arising under the Act so as to fall exclusively within the Board's sec-
tion 34(1) jurisdiction. Hence, the Board is insulated from judicial review 
even were a court able to establish, as a matter of construction, that the 
Board claimed jurisdiction under section 33 on an erroneous view of its 
enabling statute; in short, the function of statutory interprétation normally 
reserved to the courts for this purpose is transferred to the Board.63 
External law 
The 'external law' approach is an extension of the third argument in 
that it too postulâtes the restrictive effect of the words "under this Act".64 
Although no more tenable than the third, this approach is one on which the 
British Columbia courts hâve intervened. The following examines the 
development of the doctrine and the Board's response to it. 
THE BOARD'S RETREAT 
Re Pruden 
Early in the Code's opération, the Board did not seek to qualify section 
33. In Workmen's Compensation Board Employées et a/.,65 the Board on 
applications for certification of two Crown agencies was required to déter-
mine whether the doctrine of Crown immunity exempted the agencies from 
collective bargaining under the Code. The Board noted that its predecessor 
under the Labour Relations Act had consistently declined jurisdiction.66 In 
holding under the new législation that the agencies were not exempt, the 
Board confined the issue to "a very difficult question of the extent of its 
jurisdiction under s.33".67 This involved the Board in a considération of 
section 35 of the Interprétation Act, granting the Crown's immunity from 
statute.68 In applying that section, the Board made no mention of possible 
judicial scrutiny. In fact, the Board acknowledged its responsibility to the 
législature, not the courts: 
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"The législature contemplated that this Board would take a responsible attitude in 
respecting the légal framework from which it dérives its jurisdiction. By the same 
token, when it enactedprovisions such as ss.33 and 34, it certainly did not envisage 
that the Board would adopt a narrow, legalistic approach in defining the scope ofits 
powers ... . In applying such légal concept as "Crown agency", the Board must see 
that it fits sensibly into the contemporary realities of industrial relations and labour 
law policy in British Columbia."69 
This passage is not indicative of an administrative tribunal mindful of 
the prérogative writ; that the board's inquiry involved law external to the 
Code did not dissuade the Board from claiming exclusive jurisdiction to 
dispose of the matter. This is no longer the case. 
In Pruden v Assessment Authority of British Columbia,70 the Suprême 
Court held, quashing the décision of the Board,71 that the Board erred in its 
interprétation of the statute creating the British Columbia Assessment 
Authority. The Board assumed jurisdiction on the ground that the relevant 
sections of the Act and the Code were not in conflict. Section 20 of the 
Assessment Authority of British Columbia Act provides: 
4
 '20(1 )(a) [EJvery person employed by the Crown or by a Municipality in respect of 
assessment, and who is designated by the authority, shall, ... be deemed to be an 
employée of the authority..." 
(2) Where there is a conflict between this Act and any other Act, this Act 
prevails. 
(3) The Labour Code of British Columbia Act applies to employées under this 
Act." 
The Authority did not designate Pruden, an employée of the 
municipality succeeded by the Authority, as an employée pursuant to sec-
tion 20(l)(a). The Board held that the juxtaposition of this section and sec-
tion 53 of the Code, governing employée successor rights, required the 
Authority to designate every person whose employment survives the succes-
sion; that the discrétion reserved to the Authority pursuant to section 
20(1 )(a) was confined to those instances where there were legitimate 
business reasons for discontinuing the employment. 
However, quashing the order that Pruden be constituted an employée 
of the Authority,72 Hutcheon J. held that the right to re-employment infer-
red from section 53 of the Code was répugnant to section 20, which confer-
red an unfettered discrétion to designate successor employées. On appeal 
Seaton J.A. delivering judgment for the British Columbia Court of Ap-
peal73 upheld Hutcheon J's décision that the Board erred in its interpréta-
tion of the external statute. 
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The Board*s attitude has been to not challenge the correctness of that 
décision. In granting certiorari, Hutcheon J. equivocated: 
"It may be argued that by reason of one or more sections of The Labour Code, the 
board has exclusive jurisdiction to décide questions having to do with the construc-
tion of The Labour Code. The same argument cannot be made with respect to the 
construction of other statutes."74 
The Board took the earliest opportunity to résolve his Honour's 
equivocation. Even before Hutcheon J.'s décision was reported, Chairman 
Weiler in Transport Labour Relations and General Truck Drivers resolved 
that section 33 did indeed insulate from judicial review "only Board déci-
sions interpreting the Code, not our readings of external statutes,\75 
The second reported instance of judicial review of a Board décision is 
Re British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority,16 The issue was whether 
the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority Act11 had eliminated the 
Board's jurisdiction to enforce the Code's "good faith bargaining" re-
quirements78 pending changes to the Hydro pension scheme. The Joint 
Council of Unions argued that the Board's décision attracted its section 33 
jurisdiction. Disagreeing, the Board noted that the détermination it was 
required to make "is not one under this Act (Labour Code)".79 Citing 
Pruden v Assessment Authority of British Columbia: 
"That fact does not prevent the Board from proceeding to détermine the issue, but it 
allow that décision to be reviewable by the courts in the normal manner."80 
The Board determined that the obligations imposed by the Code were 
compatible with the Hydro statute, and rejected the employer's argument 
that it was relieved of the duty to negotiate. The British Columbia Suprême 
Court was of contrary opinion,81 following which the Suprême Court of 
Canada82 upheld the Court of Appeal's décision83 to reinstate the Board's 
ruling. 
In the initial proceeding before Murry J., the jurisdiction of the 
superior courts to review the Board's décision on the Hydro statute was not 
in issue, counsel for the Board agreeing that the power existed.84 (The mat-
ter of jurisdiction was not again raised in the appeals.) Judicial review of 
Board décisions involving the application of 'external law\ then, seems set-
tled. The difficulty in supporting it in light of the Board's section 33 
jurisdiction is discussed below.85 
Statutes Incorporating The Code 
The influence of Pruden is évident not only with respect to the Board's 
principal jurisdiction under the Code. The Board, by incorporation of the 
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powers conferred by the Code, is entrusted with the administration of a 
number of labour statutes of spécifie application.86 The usual incorporation 
clause is contained in the Essential Services Disputes Act:81 
"2(2) Unless inconsistent with this Act, the définitions, provisions and procédures 
of the Labour Code of British Columbia ... apply to this Act." 
This clause is read in conjunction with section 39A of the Interprétation 
Act, stipulating: 
"39A. Where an enactment provides that another enactment applies, it applies 
with the necessary changes and so far as it is applicable."88 
Six months prior to Pruden,89 the Board explained the législative 
premise underlying the reform of British Columbia labour law. In Canadian 
Cellulose Co Ltd et al.,90 it explained the integrated policy of the statutes 
vesting jurisdiction in the Board, a policy aimed at establishing one body 
responsible for ail phases of the Province's labour relations. In this case, the 
Board examined the incorporation clauses under the Collective Bargaining 
Continuation Act.91 Quoting Hansard,92 the Board held that it had exclusive 
jurisdiction to administer the Act, explaining that a décision in favour of 
co-ordinate jurisdiction in the courts would be anathema to "the whole 
development of labour law in this province;" that it "would make a 
mockery of the orderly system of dispute settlement... now operative under 
the Code".93 For example: 
"It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the parties to a dispute under the 
Collective Bargaining Continuation Act would be required to shuttle back and forth 
between the courts and the Board as the légal ramifications of the dispute 
unfolded."94 
The Board repeated the policy opposing co-ordinate jurisdiction: 
"[I]t would be inconsistent with a fundamental législative premise to hâve two 
tribunals administering one body of labour law. The major thème of the 1973-4 
reforms was the establishment of the Labour Relations Board as the body responsi-
ble for ail phases of labour policy in British Columbia. Apart from its functions 
under the Labour Code, the Board was entrusted with a législative mandate under 
five other statutes — .. . . The intention of the législature was to hâve one integrated 
perspective on ail facets of the collective bargaining process, rather than several 
isolated bodies each developing labour policy within its own domain."95 
Recently, in Médical Associate Clinic and Hospital Employées' Union, 
Local 180,96 the Board reconsidered its jurisdiction pursuant to the incor-
poration clauses in the Essential Services/Disputes Act. This case involved 
an application under that Act to hâve the Board déclare applicable a section 
PERFECTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION TO LABOUR DISPUTES. 397 
permitting a union to elect binding arbitration. To make this déclaration the 
Board was required to first détermine (inter alià) whether the Union was a 
"health care union" within the meaning of the Essential Services/Disputes 
Act.91 
As in the earlier case involving the Collective Bargaining Continuation 
Act, counsel's objection was that there was no jurisdiction in the Board to 
administer the législation; in Médical Associate Clinic et al. counsel arguing 
in the alternative that any jurisdiction it possessed was reviewable. The 
Board noted that counsel relied "on such cases as British American OU 
Company Limited (1963), 44 WWR 416; Lodum Holdings Ltd (1968), 67 
WWR 38; and Assessment Authority of British Columbia [1976] 6 WWR 
185".98 The Board did not comment on counsel's argument as to how 
Pruden v Assessment Authority of British Columbia affected the issue, but 
proferred that the combined effect of the incorporation clauses was to 
render applicable to the Essential Services/Disputes Act sections 31, 33 and 
34 of the Code." The Board inclined to the view, then, that not only did it 
possess jurisdiction to décide matters assigned by that Act, but also that its 
jurisdiction was exclusive and unreviewable. However, in contrast to the at-
titude earlier expressed in construing the Collective Bargaining Continua-
tion Act, 10° the Board expressly declined to rule further than that it had 
jurisdiction, refusing the législature^ invitation to hold that incorporation 
of the Code negatived the potential for review. The Board expressed its cau-
tion thus: 
"That is a brief sketch of some of the arguments in support of the proposition that 
the Board's jurisdiction over the issues in this case — including the issue of whether 
the HEU is a health care union — is an exclusive jurisdiction. Having given that 
outline, we should say that it is not our intention at this time to express any firm view 
on that subject. At an absolute minimum, it is clear to us that the Board is legally en-
titled to exercise an original jurisdiction ... ."101 
Although, as noted, the Board did not indicate how Pruden affected its 
jurisdiction under this Act, the Board's référence to Health Labour Rela-
tions Association v Hospital Employées* Union102 is a clue. In that case 
Murray J. treated the Essential Services Disputes Act as a. statute external to 
the Code (the incorporation clauses notwithstanding), but which, subject to 
the court's power of review of inferior tribunals, the Board may interpret 
and apply for purposes of the Code. 
Hère, the question was whether the court had jurisdiction to détermine 
whether an arbitrated award under that Act constituted a collective agree-
ment. Murry J. held that section 34(1) of the Code dealt with "two separate 
and distinct matters".103 First, his Honour accepted that it confers exclusive 
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jurisdiction on the Board to décide any question arising under the Code. Se-
cond, his Honour stated that it empowers the Board to décide for purposes 
o/the Code questions otherwise arising, namely, whether a collective agree-
ment has been entered into or is in full force or effect: this "may very pro-
perly" be decided by the Board for purposes of the Code "even although 
that collective agreement has been imposed by the Essential Services 
Disputes AcV\m However, "[a]s the maters before me do not arise under 
the Labour Code but under the Essential Services Disputes Act, I do not 
consider that section 34 deprives me of jurisdiction in this case."105 In Mur-
ray J's opinion, then, any Act other than the Code is 'external law' within 
the meaning of Pruden, the Code's incorporation notwithstanding. 
Citing Health Labour Relations Association et al., the Board repeated 
its caution in claiming jurisdiction under the Essential Services Disputes Act 
in Ladner Priva te Hospital Ltd. et al. and Hospital Employées' Union, 
Local 180.106 The following dicta illustrate the Board's acceptance of Mur-
ray J.'s décision, applying the 'external law' approach the statutes incor-
porating the Code: 
"As a gênerai proposition, the Board is entitled to take into account statutes other 
than the Labour Code in the course of adjudicating issues under the Code itself... . 
If it is necessary for the Board to interpret and apply législation external to the Code, 
its jurisdiction to do so is an original one and subject to judicial review".107 
Applying that * 'proposition* ': 
"Nor is there anything in the Essential Services Disputes Act which would suggest 
that this authority of the Board to consider statutes other than the Labour Code is 
inapplicable in the case of that statute."108 
With référence to counsel's objection to the Board's jurisdiction: 
"[T]he most that can be said about a décision under Section 34(1) (g) of the Code is 
that the Labour Relations Board will be required to consider the effect of Section 6 
of the Essential Services Disputes Act.. . . In this respect, we accept the dicta of Mur-
ray J in the Health Labour Relations Association décision, supra, as a correct ex-
pression of the Board's jurisdiction."109 
In this light it cannot be contended that the Board disclaimed its stated 
policy in construing the Collective Bargaining Continuation Actno for 
reasons other than the way in which the judiciary, commencing with 
Pruden, has penetrated the Board's exclusive jurisdiction. The ease with 
which those inroads hâve been made is attributable mainly to the ab-
breviated manner in which thèse statutes hâve bequeathed jurisdiction to 
the Board; incorporation of the Code's provisions by gênerai clauses invites 
the characterization of the statutes as législation external to the Code. For 
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this reason it is difficult to understand why the draftsman elected not to 
duplicate in thèse statutes (with the necessary modifications for the pur-
poses of each) sections 31-34 of the Code, thereby excluding the 'external 
law' approach pursuant to the Board*s jurisdiction to détermine its jurisdic-
tion under each Act respectively. 
THE JUDICIAL INCURSION 
(a) 'External law' and section 33 
In Pruden, Seaton J.A. for the Court of Appeal explained the rétention 
of the court's power to review: 
"[W]e hâve not been required in this case to consider the Board's exclusive jurisdic-
tion, the privative clauses in the code or the court's power to grant certiorari respec-
ting décisions of the Labour Relations Board of British Columbia."111 
This was stated in response to counsers position, that "the interpréta-
tion of the [external] Act by the board is [not] protected by the privative 
clauses of the code":112 
"His position was that the Board was entitled to interpret the Act as part of its func-
tion but such interprétation was open to review on certiorari." 
Without further référence to the Code, the Court of Appeal affirmed 
Hutcheon J.'s décision to quash; counsel's concession inviting the courts 
oversight of the Board's section 33 jurisdiction. 
The language of section 33 is unambiguous. Not only does it give the 
Board "exclusive jurisdiction to détermine the extent of its jurisdiction 
under this Act" (that is, the Code). It also grants the Board "exclusive 
jurisdiction ... to détermine any fact or question of law that is necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction". Thèse words do not confine the Board to ques-
tions of law or fact arising on the Code's provisions: read literally, the ex-
clusive jurisdiction "to détermine any fact or question of law" embraces 
any statute or rule of common law where, in the Board's opinion, the déter-
mination is necessary for it to establish jurisdiction. Seaton J.A. for the 
Court of Appeal reasoned otherwise, however. Characterizing the issue as 
one of 'external law', the judgé thought it axiomatic that the court's power 
to review survived.113 
Re British Columbia Hydro and Power AuthorityUA illustrâtes the error 
in that assumption. Hère, it was not disputed that in the absence of the 
Hydro statute the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Code in 
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order to compel the Authority to bargain collectively.115 Whether the statute 
did pre-empt the Board's jurisdiction (that is, in circumstances where it was 
otherwise conceded) involved a question of law requiring détermination. 
Section 33, in thèse circumstances, is explicit. Further, as évidence that the 
détermination was necessary in order for the Board to establish jurisdiction, 
the Court of Appeal and Suprême Court of Canada upheld the Board's 
jurisdiction on the very interprétation of the Hydro statute as that on which 
the Board proceeded.116 As with the Board, then, thèse courts could not 
détermine jurisdiction irrespective of the 'external law' détermination. 
The same necessity for the Board to entertain 'external law' arose in 
Association of Commercial and Technical Employées, Local 1728 and 
McGeer, et al.ni Though no application for review was made in this case, 
the Board's acceptance of Pruden further illustrâtes the criticism. Hère the 
Board held that it had original jurisdiction to rule on a "somewhat murky 
area of quasi-constitutional law" in order to establish jurisdiction to enter-
tain an unfair labour practice complaint.118 Allégations were made against a 
Minister of the Crown (and others) in respect of statements about members 
of a certified bargaining unit seeking successorship rights in educational 
establishments. It was alleged that thèse violated section 5 of the Code, in 
that they amounted to "coercion or intimidation" capable of compelling 
persons to cease to be members of a trade union. The Minister's objection 
to the Board's jurisdiction was that his statements, made as Member of the 
British Columbia Législative Assembly, were protected by the parliamen-
tary privilège of freedom of speech. Rejecting this, the Board ruled: 
"[RJesolution of this issue requires a judgment from the Board about a complex and 
somewhat murky area of quasi-constitutional law, ail of which is external to the 
Labour Code itself. But ail parties were agreed that the Board does hâve an original 
jurisdiction to make up its own mind about the légal question, once if [sic] was raised 
in the course of an unfair labour practice complaint which was properly brought 
under the Labour Code. Of course, since our judgment hère turns on the interpréta-
tion of a body of law outside the Labour Code, this is not a matter within the 
Board's exclusive jurisdiction under Section 33 et al. of the code. "n9 
This décision, that the Board had only an original jurisdiction to 
résolve the Minister's objection, is pertinent in that the objection was raised 
in the course of a matter * 'properly brought under the ... Code". The issue, 
therefore, was the same as in Re British Columbia Hydro and Power 
Authority: whether the Board's jurisdiction was ousted by external law in 
circumstances where there was no dispute that it otherwise existed.120 
To reiterate, section 33 désignâtes "exclusive jurisdiction" in the 
Board "to détermine any fact or question of law that is necessary [for the 
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Board] to establish its jurisdiction ... under this Act". The canons of 
statutory interprétation require that words of enactment be given 
effect; 121that plain words be given their ordinary meaning;122 but that this be 
declined where it would resuit in an absurdity or otherwise negate the 
législature^ intent.123 No absurdity, nor négation of the législature^ intent, 
results from attributing the words of section 33, above, their ordinary 
meaning. Thus, to construe the Code as granting only an original, 
reviewable jurisdiction over thèse 'external law' issues nécessitâtes excising 
from section 33 the second limb, empowering the Board with regard to 
"any fact or question of law".124 Confirming this, consistency requires that 
the single jurisdiction granted by section 33 vis a vis each of the three limbs 
be either original or exclusive. Contrary to the view in Association of Com-
mercial and Technical Employées, Local 1728 and McGeer, it cannot be 
both exclusive and original depending on the character of the law affecting 
jurisdiction, that is, as being exclusive (and unreviewable) when involving 
the Code and original (and reviewable) when involving 'external law\ 
'External law' and competing policy régimes 
Attendant on the 'external law' approach, the Board in Transport 
Labour Relations and General Truck Drivers acknowledged the con-
sidérable potential for review resulting from the need to interpret statutes 
empowering other tribunals.125 Commenting in this case on the "uneasy in-
teraction" of the Code and the Anti-Inflation Act: 
"The Labour Code does not exist as a lonely légal island. Its practice must be mesh-
ed in a cohérent way with other integrated segments of the légal System, whether 
thèse be employment standards, human rights, occupational health and safety, or 
price and income controls. ... this Board ... does not exist in an institutional vacuum. 
We are an administrative tribunal with the primary responsibility to interpret and ap-
ply a comprehensive collective bargaining law. But it is the Anti-Inflation Board 
which is the primary jurisdiction over the wage and price controls."126 
Deferring to Pruden, the Board conceded that any décision based on 
thèse "other segments of the légal System",,27 even though such décisions be 
exclusively for purposes of the Code, would be amenable to judicial 
review.128 Such was not the case in British Columbia prior to Pruden, 
however. Indeed, in Re Lodum Holdings Ltd,129 the potential for review 
which the Board acknowledged in thèse circumstances130caused Dryer J. to 
reject the 'external law' ground as the test for jurisdiction. 
In an application to quash two décisions of the Board's predecessor 
under the Labour Relations Act, the issue before Dryer J. was whether a 
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transaction concluded by the company was a "sale, lease, or transfer" 
within the meaning of section 12(11) of that Act. If so, pursuant to section 
12(11) any existing collective agreement would continue to bind the com-
pany notwithstanding the transaction. The judge agreed that neither he nor 
the Board could détermine this by référence to the enabling statute alone; 
indeed, that "the whole law must be considered".131 Counsel further sub-
mitted, citing Parkhill Furniture and Bedding Ltd v International Moulders 
Union,132 that whenever a tribunal is required to apply légal principles exter-
nal to the enabling statute, it must do so correctly to be within its jurisdic-
tion. His Honour did not agrée, holding the question hère to be one assign-
ed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Whether it erred in applying 
"the whole law", then, was not a ground on which to attack the Board's 
décision that the applicant was bound by the existing collective agreement. 
In so holding, the court did not doubt the potential for judicial review were 
it to accept counsers 'external law' argument: 
"In determining almost any question that cornes before a labour relations board or 
any other statutory or other inferior tribunal, the whole law must be considered. In 
very few situations can the question be determined by référence to the enabling 
statute alone, and even when, at first sight, it might appear to be so, that does not so 
appear because the other principle of law involved in the décision are so unassailable 
as to achieve little prominence in the inquiry. Furthermore, the principles under 
which certiorari is to apply must be applicable to ail inferior tribunals and not merely 
to those which operate under a statute with simple confines."133 
Although Pruden overrules Re Lodum Holdings Ltd., neither Hut-
cheon N. nor the Court of Appeal referred to this décision, possibly for the 
reason that counsel for the Board in Pruden conceded the 'external law' 
ground for review.134 Alternatively, it may be that their Honours were 
cognizant the Code had indeed excluded the traditional ground affiirmed by 
Dryer J. 
'External law' and the labour statute 
Finally, the potential for review arises not only where policy régimes as 
those acknowledged in Transport Labour Relations et al.135 impinge on the 
Board's jurisdiction; contrary to the législative reform,136 it arises also 
within the broad framework of the Province's labour régime. 
In Ladner Private Hospital Ltd. et al. and Hospital Employées* Union 
Local 180,137 the Board rejected the argument that it had no jurisdiction 
under section 34(1) (g) of the Code to détermine whether an award ar-
bitrated under the Essential Services Disputes Act constituted a collective 
agreement. In so doing, the Board also confirmed the 'external law' ground 
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for review. This was despite not only the Code's incorporation into that 
Act, but also its observation that "there is now ... a substantialproportion 
of collective bargaining disputes in this Province to be settled by binding ar-
bitration under that législation'\138 
This case involved issues exclusively within the Province*s labour 
régime — the application was made under the Code139and involved "signifi-
cant issues of policy' ' the Board noted, issues critical to the Province's 
labour relations.140 But because the Essential Services Disputes Act — itself 
a labour statute — was incidently involved in the application, the Board af-
firmed the potential for review. This was "unavoidable in view of the judg-
ment of Murray J. in the Health Labour Relations case",141 the policy basis 
of the Board's décision on the Essential Services Disputes Act notwith-
standing: 
"In making this judgment under the Code, we are directed to hâve regard to the ob-
jects of the Code set out in section 27. We are unable to perceive any industrial rela-
tions considérations which would compel us to conclude that the arbitration ... has 
failed to impose collective agreements ... . On the contrary, ... unless there are com-
pelling industrial relations considérations which dictate a contrary conclusion [i.e., 
considérations comprising the Board's policy], the Board will be inclined to find that 
the resuit of an arbitration under the Essential Services Disputes Act is a collective 
agreement in force and effect . . . . This inclination is a product of the purposes and 
objects of the Code articulated in section 27: 
(a) securing and maintaining industrial peace, and furthering harmonious relations 
between employers and employées; 
(b) promoting conditions favourable to the orderly and constructive settlement of 
disputes between employers and employées or their freely chosen 
trade-unions."142 
At least for purposes of those statutes incorporating the Code, this case 
shows it is a misnomer for courts to talk of "external law" qua the ground 
for review of Board décisions. Aside being extensions of the Code through 
the incorporation clauses, thèse statutes and the Code comprise the Pro-
vince's labour législation, to be administered according to the labour policy 
to which the Board gave effect in that case. Certainly, the Minister in 1973 
was anticipating the removal of the court's jurisdiction over "labour 
disputes"143 — not simply those to be governed by the Code — when he 
spoke of the court's inability to grasp "the overall labour picture".144 
CONCLUSION 
Given post-war labour policy in Canada, it is problematic that the set-
tlement of the three-cornered constitutional debate of the seventeenth cen-
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tury, guaranteeing freedom from abuse of executive power, is today ex-
pressed in terms of the citizen's right of access to the courts.145 Pruden v 
Assessment Authority ofBritish Columbia146is a reminder of that right, and 
the judiciary's ability to préserve it when threatened by privative provisions. 
Yet, it cannot be said that the tribunal responsible for administering the 
British Columbia législation was insensitive to that reminder, since to hâve 
challenged Pruden would hâve set the Labour Relations Board and the 
courts on a collision course which only the courts could hâve won. The 
Board's immédiate acceptance of that décision can best be described as an 
attempt to protect its autonomy in those areas most critical to the Code. To 
hâve challenged Pruden on a literal construction of the Code would hâve 
risked further scrutiny of its jurisdiction, and the possibility of the judiciary 
undermining further the législative policy. 
The speeches in the House in 1973 suggest that judges in British Colum-
bia would be loath the re-enter the labour relations arena.147 But labour 
disputes invariably work to the économie détriment of some party, and 
courts hâve seldom declined the opportunity to find a violation of légal 
right where property interests are threatened.148 It is not unlikely that the 
Board's response to Hutcheon J.'s décision was devised in the knowledge of 
this.149 
Since Pruden, there has been no attempt to penetrate further the 
Code's privative clauses, the inroads made in that case seemingly satisfying 
the judiciary's désire for lordship over the administrative tribunal. The 
compromise apparently reached may satisfy those who believe that the 
scope of judicial review ought to reflect the relative expertise of the judge 
and the administrative decision-maker; the former trained to détermine the 
limits of the law, the latter mandated to apply policy in accordance with the 
law. Where the administrative decision-maker is faced with légal issues 
preliminary to its policy régime, issues in respect of which the agency has no 
spécial qualification, it might be thought that the rétention of the court's 
jurisdiction to make the final détermination is désirable. Exponents of this 
view, then, might welcome Pruden. 15° 
But for the judiciary to delve further into the British Columbia Code 
would be not only an unwelcome intrusion, but also an assertion of judicial 
supremacy over the législature. Laskin warned of this as early as 1952, 
"why the courts, as one agency of government, should not respect the 
authority and responsibility of another agency, the législature, in matters 
where no issue of distribution of législative power arises".151 The Code 
sought to, and did, exclude the orthodox justification for penetrating the 
privative clause. "[The Privative clause] cannot be intended to transform 
PERFECTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION TO LABOUR DISPUTES. 405 
tribunals into judicial libertines", the Suprême Court explained recently: 
4
 The view that tribunals are not compétent to set the limits of their own 
jurisdiction is firmly entrenched".152 Although the connotations of the 
word ''libertine'' are better ignored, this is exactly what the British Colum-
bia législature intended, and by clear words of enactment did, when it 
enacted section 33. 
How justified, then, is Professor Wade's récent comment, counselling 
courts not to be dissuaded by the Code's novel privative provisions?153 This 
is difficult to reconcile with his teachings on législative supremacy: "that 
the rule enjoining judicial obédience to statutes is one of the fundamental 
rules on which the légal System dépends".154 Since Professor Wade's opi-
nions are entitled to the greatest respect, it would be enlightening to learn 
the basis on which he would distinguish the Code as being inherently dif-
férent from other statutes. True, his thesis is that the "rule" is rather "the 
ultimate political fact" on which législative supremacy hangs155 but this can-
not, of itself, vindicate distinguishing the Code as an instrument unworthy 
of the court's loyalty. Even accepting what judges may perceive of their 
constitutional authority, does not the public interest in devising workable 
procédures for minimising labour disruption demand that loyalty? 
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La solution administrative aux conflits du travail 
L'expérience de la Colombie Britannique 
«Les cours de justice ne peuvent vraiment avoir qu'une vue sommaire de l'en-
semble des problèmes du travail. Leur intervention dans le passé n'a été que sporadi-
que et fortuite. Les juges ne connaissent pas en profondeur le processus dynamique 
des relations professionnelles et de la négociation collective. Pour ces raisons, le 
nouveau Code du travail a écarté la compétence des cours en matière de conflits du 
travail. La nouvelle loi recherche une solution administrative plutôt que judiciaire 
aux conflits du travail». 
C'est ainsi que s'exprimait le ministre du Travail de la Colombie Britannique au 
cours d'un débat en 1973. 
Rechercher "une solution administrative plutôt que judiciaire aux différends du 
travail» est, pour s'exprimer en termes généraux, une politique qui est commune 
dans la législation canadienne en matière de négociation collective. Cependant, ce 
qui est propre au Code du travail de la Colombie Britannique, ce sont les moyens par 
lesquels le Code du travail de cette province cherche à mettre au point la solution ad-
ministrative «Nouvelle, controversée, discutable au point de vue constitutionnel». 
Telle est la façon dont un commentateur a décrit cette disposition qui se lit ainsi: 
«33. La Commission a et exerce compétence exclusive pour déterminer les limites 
de sa compétence en vertu de cette loi, d'une convention collective et de règlements et 
pour connaître de tout fait ou question de droit qui sont essentiels à l'exercice de sa 
compétence et pour déterminer si elle exercera ou non sa compétence et de quelle 
manière elle l'exercera.». L'arrière-plan de la désobéissance judiciaire à la clause 
privative dans la législation du travail au Canada fait voir pourquoi la législature de 
la Colombie Britannique a conféré cette compétence nouvelle à l'organisme chargé 
d'appliquer le Code du travail dans cette province. À une date aussi reculée que 
1952, le professeur Bora Laskin (fonction qu'il occupait alors) faisait observer «l'ap-
parente futilité» des efforts variés faits dans l'après-guerre pour écarter la juridiction 
de la cours des questions attribuées aux commissions de relations du travail. «Face à 
de tels textes législatifs, notait Lakin, la persistance des cours à exercer un pouvoir de 
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révision ne comporte une attribution d'autorité que sur le fondement d'un principe 
constitutionnel (et un tel principe n'existe pas) et sur la base de quelque théorie «éliti-
que» de connaître ce qui est préférable pour tout le monde». 
Le concept qui sous-tend l'intervention des cours en matière de clauses 
privatives, qui enjoignent à ces cours de ne pas intervenir, n'existe pas qu'au 
Canada. Notez la clause privative ordinaire écartant du pouvoir de révision judiciaire 
«toute décision, ordre, directive ou réglementation du tribunal administratif» en 
question. Puisqu'une «décision, un ordre ... ou une réglementation» outrepassant 
les pouvoirs statutaires du tribunal (c'est-à-dire sa compétence) n'est en réalité ni une 
«décision», ni un «ordre», ni un «règlement», ils ne sont pas protégés par la clause 
privative. Donc, le plus que ces clauses ont signifié, c'est d'exclure l'intervention de 
la cour, là ou l'erreur d'une commission, qu'elle soit de fait ou de droit, n'en n'est 
pas une relative à sa compétence. 
C'est en vue de donner des dents à la clause privative du Code, contenue à l'arti-
cle 34(2) que l'Assemblée législative de la Colombie Britannique a adopté l'article 33. 
En résumé, conformément à l'article 33, la Commission est autorisée à fixer les 
limites de sa propre compétence — y compris à cette fin le pouvoir de connaître de 
tout fait et de toute question de droit qu'il lui faut trancher pour établir sa compéten-
ce — d'où il découle que toute erreur que la Commission commet n'entache pas sa 
compétence et se trouve dans les limites de la clause privative. 
Cependant, on peut prévoir que, malgré l'article 33 du Code, les cours aient l'in-
tention de réclamer juridiction. L'article étudie quatre de ces arguments. Deux 
autres, qui se rapportent à l'aspect constitutionnel de la compétence de la Commis-
sion, touchant à la question du partage des pouvoirs entre le gouvernement fédéral et 
les provinces du Canada, ne sont pas étudiés. Bien qu'il ne s'agisse qu'une question 
de temps avant que ces arguments d'ordre constitutionnel soient vérifiés judiciaire-
ment au Canada, la jurisprudence sur laquelle ils se fondent a été examinée dans 
d'autres instances. Des quatre autres arguments, on peut dire qu'ils se rapportent à 
la solution administrative des différends du travail et à l'habileté des cours à retirer 
sa compétence à l'organisme administratif. 
La conclusion à laquelle on en arrive, c'est que le Code de la Colombie Britanni-
que, grâce à l'interaction de l'article 33 et des autres dispositions de la loi relatives à 
la compétence fait obstacle à la justification ordinaire de la cour pour excéder ou 
contourner la clause d'exclusion. Cependant, ce n'est pas toutes les affaires que les 
cours de la Colombie Britannique l'ont accepté. L'affaire Pruden contre Assessment 
Authority ofBritish Columbia a établi que, là où, aux fins d'établir sa juridiction, la 
Commission de cette province doit interpréter une loi autre que le Code, il y a 
matière à révision de sa décision par les cours en la manière habituelle. Le présent ar-
ticle met en doute cette conclusion eu égard à la compétence exclusive de la Commis-
sion non pas simplement de déterminer elle-même les limites de sa compétence, mais 
aussi de «connaître de tout fait ou de toute question de droit nécessaire pour établir 
sa compétence». Il suffit de noter que les mots «toute ... question de droit» ne sont 
pas qualifiés; ils ne se lisent pas toute ... question de droit découlant de la loi, (c'est-
à-dire du Code). 
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Là ou la Commission administrative se trouve ainsi en présence de questions 
d'ordre juridique préliminaires à son rôle essentiel — questions au sujet desquelles 
elle n'a pas de qualification spéciale — on peut penser que le maintien de la compé-
tence des tribunaux de décider en dernier ressort est souhaitable. Mais le principe que 
l'affaire Pruden a posé n'est pas aussi limité qu'on peut le croire. À la suite de cette 
affaire, les tribunaux de la Colombie Britannique ont élargi le critère de «la loi ex-
terne» aux fins de révision des décisions de la Commission au-delà de la loi générale 
de façon à inclure plusieurs lois spéciales du travail qui comprennent «les définitions, 
les dispositions et les règles de procédure du Code du travail». L'inclusion des dispo-
sitions légales du Code au moyen de clauses générales d'incorporation à ces lois avait 
pour objet comme le signalait la Commission, d'éviter une situation «où les parties à 
un conflit découlant du Collective Bargaining Continuation Act seraient obligées de 
faire la navette entre les tribunaux et la Commission au fur et à mesure que se révéle-
raient les ramifications légales du différend». Et la Commission ajoutait ce qui suit: 
«Il serait contraire à un principe législatif fondamental d'avoir recours à deux tribu-
naux pour administrer un ensemble de législations du travail. Le thème principal des 
réformes de 1973-74 était l'établissement de la Commission des relations du travail 
comme l'organisme responsable de toutes les questions de relations du travail en 
Colombie Britannique. En plus de ses fonctions dérivées du Code du travail, la Com-
mission s'est vue confier un mandat en vertu de cinq autres lois ...». 
En fait, le maintien du droit de réforme des tribunaux non seulement va-t-il à 
rencontre de la politique législative appuyant les réformes en Colombie Britannique, 
mais aussi des effets que l'on recherchait par l'introduction des clauses d'incorpora-
tion. Comme celles-ci incorporent aux fins de chaque pitce de législation l'article 33 
du Code du travail la compétence exclusive de la Commission de «déterminer les 
limites de sa compétence en vertu de la loi» ne réfère pas en pareil cas au Code, mais 
à la loi dans laquelle a été incorporé l'article 33, ce qui ne laisse par conséquent 
aucune place à l'approche fondée sur le concept de «la loi externe». 
La question posée est loin d'être nouvelle cependant. Car, en remontant aussi 
loin que 1952, le professeur Laskin se demandait «pourquoi les tribunaux, en tant 
qu'agences de l'État, ne respectaient pas l'autorité et la responsabilité d'une autre 
agence, la législature, dans les matières où ne repose aucune question relative au par-
tage des pouvoirs législatifs». Si, comme on le croit, l'intention du législateur de 
créer une commission du travail indépendante et autonome sert l'intérêt public en 
minimisant le désordre dans le monde du travail, alors quelle justification y a-t-il à 
cette aversion pour la clause privative? 
